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ADVANCE TOWARD “PEOPLE’S COURT” IN SOUTH
KOREA
Yong Chul Park†
Abstract: Since 2008, criminal jury trials have been implemented in South
Korea with the Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials Act. Under the Act, defendants
have the option to choose a jury trial over a bench trial, although jury verdicts, as well as
sentencing opinions rendered by a jury, are not binding on the court pursuant to Article
46(2) of the Act. While Korea’s adoption of a criminal jury trial was an ambitious move
toward judicial reform, it has faced serious obstacles and has had limited influence over
the Korean judicial system. In this Article, I use the five stages of planned legal change
identified in Malcolm Feeley’s book titled Court Reform on Trial (1983) as an analytical
framework to explain why the criminal jury trial might not be the best way to regain the
public’s confidence in the system and what should be done to better the system.
Cite as: Yong Chul Park, Advance Toward “People’s Court” in South Korea, 27 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 177 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION
Studying
the
four
reforms
[diagnosis,
initiation,
implementation, and routinization] in this manner, we can
assess the success of each more realistically than has so far
been done. At the same time, we can learn how the process of
change operates in the criminal courts and why it often leads to
mixed and confusing results.1

The Constitution of South Korea was last amended in 1987 2 as a result
of the June Struggle, 3 in which people demonstrated against the government
to demand direct election of the President.4 The Constitution has proven
†

Professor of Law, Sogang University Law School, Seoul, South Korea.
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 35 (1983).
2
See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] (S. Kor.). The 1987 Constitution of
South Korea has very “detailed Bill of Rights provisions regarding criminal procedural rights.” For that
reason, this phenomenon has been called “constitutionalization of criminal procedure.” However, such
“constitutionalization” did not take the people’s factor into account. See generally Kuk Cho, The Exclusion
of Illegally Obtained Confessions, Electronic Communications and Physical Evidence in Korea, 13 J.
KOREAN L. 175 (2014).
3
Intraman, The 6.10 Democracy Movement, KOREA BRIDGE (June 6, 2011, 3:45 PM),
http://koreabridge.net/post/610-democracy-movement-610-%EB%AF%BC%EC%A3%BC%ED%95%
AD% EC%9F%81-intraman. See generally JUSTINE GUICHARD, REGIME TRANSITION AND THE JUDICIAL
POLITICS OF ENMITY: DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN SOUTH KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE 23–46 (2016).
4
Kyung-Soo Shim, A Study on the Problem of Political Power Structure under the Current
Constitution, 62 DONG-A L.J. 23, 36–37 (2014) (S. Kor.).
1
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resilient over thirty years of revolutionary change, including the
development of direct presidential elections. Over time, the Constitution
and the expansion of policies facilitating public involvement resulted in an
increased desire for public participation in the criminal justice system. 5
This public demand for heightened involvement in the criminal justice
system was triggered by the establishment of the Constitutional Court and its
subsequent growing legitimacy. 6 With public recognition that, while there is
no absolute law, the law profoundly affects people’s everyday lives in the
real world, the establishment of the Constitutional Court by the 1987
Constitution led to the rejection of the absolutism that existed since the birth
of the country.7 The public’s strong desire to engage in legislating,
implementing, and changing current laws has created an opportunity for the
public’s opinion to solidify the existence of Constitutional Court.
In concert with these developments, the public distrusted the existing
criminal justice system.8 In multiple instances, illegitimate political regimes
brought fabricated charges against innocent defendants.9 Many of these
charges resulted in the execution of innocent people.10 This abuse of the
judiciary left a permanent stain on the courts and ensured that the public
distrusted South Korea’s overall criminal justice system. 11 That distrust led
the public to demand change to the criminal justice system; this was the
most critical driving force behind any attempt for justice reform in twentyfirst century South Korea. 12
The increased engagement of the public, the confidence in the
Constitutional Court, and the enormous distrust of the criminal justice
system led the people of South Korea to propose changes to the criminal
justice system.13 One suggested approach was for the people to elect judges
5

Jaesuk Lee, The Final Format of the Korean Jury Trial System, 59 L. Rev. 417, 420–21 (2014) (S.

Kor.).
6

Ki-Choon Song, An Appraisal of the Rule of Law during the Participatory Government (20032008) in Korea, 35 PUB. L.J. 297, 313–14 (2007) (S. Kor.).
7
Jeong-In Yun & Seon-Taek Kim, Constitutional Court as a Guardian of Democracy, 16 PUB. L.J.
135, 141 (2015) (S. Kor.).
8
Dong-Hee Lee, The Achievements and Challenges of the Citizen Participatory Trial in Korea, 146
JUSTICE 69, 72–73 (2015) (S. Kor.).
9
Deok-In Lee, The Justification on the Abolition of Death Penalty: The Judicial Murder and
Wrongful Convictions of the Death Penalty, 12 CHUNG-ANG L. REV. 111, 122–33 (2010) (S. Kor.).
10
Id. at 126.
11
Yun & Kim, supra note 7, at 136.
12
Tae Hoon Ha, Public Trust in Justice, 134 JUSTICE 575, 577 (2013) (S. Kor.).
13
Id. at 587.
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who would be attentive to the public’s opinion whenever they had to render
important decisions affecting millions of voters’ lives.14 Another suggestion
was to guarantee seats at the Supreme Court of South Korea for non-lawyer
candidates, thus ensuring that the justices in the highest court of the Country
would consider how the general public would think when making their
decisions.15
While some of these ideas are still viable, only the use of jury trials
received sufficient support from the public to actively develop it. 16
However, the successful launch of the criminal jury trial was not without
concern, as many worried that people’s direct involvement in the criminal
justice process would aggravate their distrust of the system rather than
alleviate it.17 The public worried that fairness of the jury verdict and
sentencing opinion could be tainted.18 Some were concerned that lay people
would not be sufficiently trained to distinguish between the true and false
facts produced by both parties at trial.19 Others expressed discomfort
because jury trials forced defendants to reveal details of their private lives to
lay people, making defendants more likely to lose face publicly during the
trial process.20
Yet the National Assembly chose the criminal jury trial because it
viewed this approach as the most revolutionary and democratic solution to
the public confidence crisis. The year 2008 marked the inception of criminal
jury trials in South Korea.21 An Act titled “Citizen Participation in Criminal
Trials” (“the Act”) solidified the jury trial as a part of the South Korean
14

A bill regarding direct election of the chief justice and other fellow justices was devised and
passed by the National Assembly in 1961. Daebeop-won jangmitdae beopgwan seon-geobeop-an [Chief
Justice and Judges Election Bill], Act No. 050164, Jan. 13, 1961 (S. Kor.),
http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=003206. However, attempts to introduce direct
democracy into the judicial branch were subverted by a military regime led by President Jung-Hee Park in
the following years.
15
See generally Younghoon Kim, Seeking a Judicial Personnel System to Protect Judicial
Independence, 27 YONSEI L. REV. 1 (2017) (detailing the long-debated assertion that enhancing diversity in
the Supreme Court would be beneficial in terms of guaranteeing the fairness of court) (S. Kor.).
16
Dong Eon Cha, The Effect of the Jury System on Development of Democracy, 5 SEOUL NAT’L U.
L. REV. 166, 168–69 (2015) (S. Kor.).
17
Id. at 168.
18
Id.
19
Byung-Soo Kim, The Realization of a Fair Participatory Trial by Division of Fact-Finding and
Sentencing, 27 J. KOREAN L. 109, 113–14 (2015) (S. Kor.).
20
See generally Ho-Kyum Kim & Kwang-Sub Park, A Study of the Methods for Activation of Jury
Trial System in Korea, 24 CHUNGNAM L. REV. 301 (2013) (S. Kor.).
21
Jae-Hyup Lee, Korean Jury Trial: Has the New System Brought About Changes?, 12 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL’Y J. 58, 59 (2010).
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criminal justice system.22 Its title also reinforced the importance of “citizen
participation” in the criminal justice system.23
South Korea’s inclusion of jury trials in its criminal justice system is
perceived by criminal law scholars and the public alike as democratic
because it guarantees the public’s involvement in every phase of a criminal
trial.24 Furthermore, the Act was structured to minimize any interference
from professional judges in rendering verdicts and giving opinions on
sentencing.25 For example, Article 46(2) limits the role of the judges by
providing that “the jury may hear opinions of judges who take part in the
trial when a majority of jurors requests to do so.” Additionally, under the
Act, defendants have the option to choose a jury trial over a bench trial.26
However, a jury verdict, as well as a sentencing opinion rendered or
recommended by that jury, will not be binding on the court pursuant to
Article 46(5) of the Act.27
The adoption of the criminal jury trial started with an ambitious move
towards the revolution of the criminal justice system as a part of judicial
reform. However, this reform had a limited influence over the criminal
justice system as a whole. 28 Thus, the groundbreaking solution to

22

Gukmin-ui hyongsajaepan chamyeo-e gwanhan beopryul [Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal
Trials], Act No. 8495, June 1, 2007, amended by Act No. 10258, Apr. 15, 2010, amended by Act No.
11155, Jan. 17, 2012, amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013, amended by Act No. 12844, Nov. 19,
2014, amended by Act No. 13762, Jan. 19, 2016, amended by Act No. 14184, May 29, 2016 (S.
Kor.), translated
in
Korea
Legislation
Research
Institute
online
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (search required) [hereinafter Act on Citizen
Participation in Criminal Trials].
23
Jin-yeon Chung, Juror as the Representative of the Citizens in the Civil Participation in Criminal
Jury Trial, 21 SOONGSIL L. REV. 201, 203–04 (2009) (S. Kor.).
24
Cha, supra note 16, at 175–76.
25
Article 46(3) of the Act provides that “if the jury fails to reach an unanimous verdict of guilt or
non-guilt, the jury shall hear opinions of judges who take part in the trial before delivering a verdict. In
such cases, a verdict of guilt or non-guilt shall be concluded by a majority decision. Judges who take part in
the trial shall not participate in the verdict, even in cases where they attend the deliberation and make
statements on their opinions.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 46(3). This Article
expresses the Act’s intent to minimize the influence from the bench in criminal jury trials. However, there
is some counter argument that judge intervention is rather excessive. Oh-Geol Kwon, Korean Jury Trial
System: Present and Future, 44 L. REV. 225, 239–40 (2011) (S. Kor.).
26
Kwon, supra note 25, at 233–34. Article 8 provides that a court needs to assure a defendant of
his/her right to a participatory trial to the maximum. Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 8.
27
Article 46(5) of the Act provides that “No verdict and opinions under paragraphs (2) through (4)
shall be binding on the court.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 46(5).
28
Kwon, supra note 25, at 229–30.
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revolutionize the criminal justice system through criminal jury trials must be
re-examined in order to better South Korea’s system.29
This Article uses the five stages of planned legal change identified in
Malcolm Feeley’s book Court Reform on Trial as an analytical framework to
explain why the South Korean criminal jury trial might not be the best way
to regain the public’s confidence in the system, and what should be done in
order to better the system. Feeley identifies the following five stages: 1)
diagnosis or conception, where, through “the process of identifying
problems and considering solutions, . . . different perspectives lead people to
identify different problems and suggest different remedies;” 2) initiation,
where “new functions are added or practices are significantly altered . . . .
This stage requires several decisions [regarding] [w]hich of several
alternatives will be adopted[];” 3) implementation, “involving staffing,
clarifying goals, and adapting to a new environment;” 4) routinization,
“which involves commitment by an institution to supply funding and a
physical base of operations;” and 5) evaluation, “in which new programs are
usually assessed during their experimental stages rather than their routine
periods. . . .”30 This Article argues that the adoption of the criminal jury trial
cannot be the best solution to reform the court because both the audience and
influence that the jury may create in the entire criminal justice system are
fairly limited.
II.

IMPORTANT STAGES IN THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
A.

Stage One: Diagnosis of the Problem

This section provides a historical overview of the criminal justice
system in South Korea and describes the perception problem that has
impeded the operation of the criminal justice system.
1.

A Brief Political and Legal History of South Korea

South Korea is a young democracy. 31 It was established in 1948,
three years after World War II.32 At that time, United States troops marched
29

Many scholars, even those with the opinion that the Act does not need constitutional amendment
in order to make the Act constitutional, argue that the Act does need some changes. B. Kim, supra note 19,
at 112–16; Kwon, supra note 25, at 229–32.
30
FEELEY, supra note 1, at xiii.
31
Soon-Won Kang, Democracy and Human Rights Education in South Korea, 38 COMP. EDUC.
315–16 (2002).
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in the south of the Korean peninsula while Soviet troops occupied the area
north of the 38th parallel.33 The country was sharply divided between the
people who led the independence movement and the people loyal to the
Imperial Japanese occupational regime. 34 Democracy and socialism were
fiercely debated due to the different ideological backgrounds of political
leaders.35 Even after a leader was elected as the President, the country was
without any proper governing system, not to mention a legal structure that
courts could rely on.36 Lacking a legal structure of its own, South Korea
resorted to using Japanese laws for quite some time. 37 The young country
struggled as a place where people could barely make a living, and it could
not afford any room for developing its own legal culture. 38 Making matters
worse, in 1950, South Korea became engulfed in the Korean War. Active
warfare ended with a truce between the United Nations and North Korea in
1953.39 However, the Korean Peninsula was devastated, with 2.5 million
dead and a destroyed socio-economic infrastructure that prevented future
development of the country.40 Immediately after the end of active hostilities,
South Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world, found itself engaging
in global politics with virtually no means to build or re-build its economy.41
Unfortunately, the first three ostensibly democratically-elected
Presidents, Syngman Lee (1948-1960), Junghee Park (1961-1979), and Doohwan Jun (1979-1988), ruled the country for nearly forty years as dictators.42
Yet even under these dictatorial rulers, South Korea became a successful
industrial economy and quickly broadened and deepened its democratic
32

Id.
Id.
34
See generally Myounghag Chang, Post-Liberation Political Situation and Schism in Democratic
Republicanism: Left-Right Ideological Confrontation and Korean National Unification, 8 E. ASIA POL. &
IDEOLOGY REV. 239 (2009) (S. Kor.).
35
See generally Won-mo Kim, The Establishment of the Republic of Korea by Syngman Rhee·Kim
ku·Kwangsoo Lee and the Attempt Unification of Korea by Kim Il-sung’s Military Force, 9 CHUNWON RES.
J. 53 (2016) (S. Kor.).
36
Hojin Choi, The Judicial System in the End of Chosun Dynasty and Before the Independence, 16
KOREAN PUB. ADMIN. HIST. REV. 223 (2005) (S. Kor.).
37
Id.
38
Han-Tae Lee, Economic Constitution and Constitutional Value of Economic Democratization, 20
SEOUL L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (S. Kor.).
39
The Korean War has never ended officially; instead, a truce agreement was made between the
U.N. and North Korea and serves to impede active warfare.
40
Dong Chun Kim, Facing 60th Anniversary of the Korean War: The Korean Peninsula and the
World, 91 HIST. CRITICISM 152, 162–64 (2010) (S. Kor.).
41
Id. at 164–70.
42
See generally Han-Joo Lee, Dealing with the Past of Authoritarian Rule in South Korea, 2 J.
CONST. L. 32, 49–80 (2015) (S. Kor.).
33
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scope.43 Despite South Korea being a formal democracy, these authoritarian
regimes were more concerned with controlling crimes and paid little
attention to criminal procedure, particularly the due process of law. 44 The
criminal justice system lacked substantive justice because, ultimately, a
dictator controlled the system.45
More specifically, the outward fairness of the criminal justice system
in South Korea, as seen in the constitution and in criminal procedure, was
ultimately tainted by the corrupting influence of the authoritarian regimes. 46
These regimes successfully forced courts to render the regimes’ preferred
rulings.47 In particular, courts responded to pressure from the regimes by
fabricating charges against political opponents and sentencing people to
lifetime imprisonment or capital punishment. For example, during President
Rhee’s lengthy tenure in office, a prominent politician, Mr. Cho, ran against
the President. He was arrested on the basis of being part of the “pro-North
Korea faction” in 1958.48 Even though most of his and his colleagues’
charges were fabricated, Mr. Cho was found guilty of espionage and
sentenced to execution in 1959.49 The first chief justice of the Supreme
Court, Byong-ro Kim, criticized the government’s actions as perverting the
justice of the criminal courts.50 The Supreme Court later decided to retry
Mr. Cho’s case and found him not guilty, admitting the wrongdoing of the
Court in rendering a guilty verdict. 51
The next dictator of South Korea, President Park, was also infamous
for his use of the criminal courts as a means for suppressing his political
opponents.52 President Park, following the example from the Meiji
Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in
Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 587 (2001); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Sun Woo Lee & Won
Kyung Chang, Participatory Governance in South Korea: Legal Infrastructure, Economic Development,
and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 375, 376 (2007).
44
Kuk Cho, The Unfinished “Criminal Procedure Revolution” of Post-Democratization in South
Korea, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 377, 377–78 (2002).
45
Iltae Hur, A Study on the History and Thought of ‘Nullum crimen sine lege’ Principles, 35
KYUNGPOOK NAT’L U. L. J. 142 (2011) (S. Kor.).
46
H. Lee, supra note 42, at 63–71 (S. Kor.).
47
Sang Hie Han, How Can the Korean People Have More Independent & More Accountable
Judiciary?, 16 J. CONST. L. 409, 413–15 (2015) (S. Kor.).
48
See GREGORY HENDERSON, KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 215 (1968).
49
See WON SOON PARK, DOCUMENTARY OF THE BARBARIC DAYS 273–98 (2006) (S. Kor.).
50
Cho, supra note 2, at 178.
51
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008JaeDo11, Jan. 20, 2011 (S. Kor.).
52
Kyungkeun Kang, Returning to the Constitutional Value and Order, 11 REV. INSTITUTION &
ECON. 163, 163–67 (2017) (S. Kor.).
43
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Restoration, declared “the Reformation Regime” in 1972, which established
him as a de facto permanent President. The regime regularly disregarded the
boundary between the executive and the judiciary, and brought fabricated
charges against innumerable democratic leaders and students.53
A
particularly important case was that against the People’s Revolution Party
Rebuilding Committee (“PRP”).54 In 1974, the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency arrested and tortured some PRP members.55 They acted on the
unfounded suspicion that the PRP had a communist connection with North
Korea and was conspiring to foment a communist revolution in South
Korea.56 In 1975, the Supreme Court rendered a final guilty decision against
eight members of the PRP.57 Within twenty-four hours of the decision, the
eight individuals were executed.58 The public called this “judicial murder”59
because the corrupt criminal justice system led to their deaths.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the dictators’ reins over the
country were loosened, democratically-elected civilian presidents had the
opportunity to overhaul the criminal justice system. 60 However, these
presidents did not make meaningful attempts to do so, nor did they achieve
real success at restructuring the system until the late 1990s.61 This failure of
democratically-elected presidents to fix the system further eroded public
trust in the “justice” conferred by the criminal justice system.62
Between the dictators’ stranglehold on the judiciary and the failure of
subsequent presidents to act immediately to reform the criminal justice
system, the public felt a need to become directly involved in reformation. 63

53

Cho, supra note 2, at 178; H. Lee, supra note 42, at 63–66.
See Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs After
Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 592–93 (2007).
55
See generally Seung-Yong Oh, State Violence and the Victimhood of Its Family: The Case of the
Committee to Reestablish the People’s Revolutionary Party, 10 KOREAN SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF HIST.
199 (2008) (S. Kor.).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 200; Cho, supra note 44, at 178–79.
58
Cho, supra note 2, at 178–79.
59
CATHOLIC HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL MURDER: THE MASSACRE OF APRIL 1975 164–
65 (2001) (S. Kor.).
60
Jin-Ho Chun, The Criminal Procedure Act Amendments and the Proper Role of Justice, 23
KYUNGPOOK NAT’L U. L. J. 25, 25–26 (2005) (S. Kor.).
61
Id. at 28; Mi Hwa Chung, Special Issue: Current Issues on Judicial Reformation Bill: Introduction
and Perspective, 55 L. ASS’N J. 19, 24 (2006) (S. Kor.).
62
Chung, supra note 61, at 25.
63
Id. at 33–35.
54
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Allowing People to be Involved in the Criminal Justice
System

The Presidential Commission on Judicial Reform (“Commission”)
and the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform (“Committee”) were
formed in 1999 and 2005, respectively. 64 Together, they functioned as the
major players in the judicial reform movement sweeping South Korea in the
early twenty-first century.65 The Commission focused on overall reform,
including creating a unitary system of lawyers, eradicating corruption, and
training future legal professionals.66 The Committee prepared complete
proposals focused on the reform of legal services and citizen participation in
the criminal justice system. 67
Most of the reformists in South Korea were convinced that the best
way to restore the public’s confidence in the system was through a paradigm
shift towards public participation in governance, including the judicial
process.68 Some reformists suggested there should be public involvement in
the appointment of specific judges.69 Other reformers thought the best
solution was for the public to adopt the role of overseeing court
procedures.70 Ultimately, the reformers decided that incorporating jury trials
was the most effective way for the public to participate in the criminal
justice system because it allowed lay people to be directly involved. 71
Following the work of the Commission and the Committee, the Act on the
Establishment & Management of Professional Law Schools and the Act on
Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials were enacted in 2007 and 2008,
respectively.72 Since 2008, jury trials have been a part of South Korea’s
criminal justice system.73

64
65

Chun, supra note 60, at 25–26.
Kyeong Ok Choi, Judicial Reform and Its Problems in Korea, 8 YOUNGSAN L. J. 3, 5–6 (2011) (S.

Kor.).
66

See generally Chung, supra note 61, at 21–50.
Id. at 33–35.
68
Bingham, Lee & Chang, supra note 43, at 376.
69
See generally Myeong-Sik Kim, A Study on the Balance between Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability: Focused on Debates about the State Judge Election System in the United
States, 22 STUDY ON AM. CONST. 1 (2011) (S. Kor.).
70
Choi, supra note 65, at 6–7.
71
Chun, supra note 60, at 28.
72
Choi, supra note 65, at 5–6.
73
Cha, supra note 16, at 168.
67
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Article 1 of the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials
provides: “the purpose of this Act is to clarify the power and responsibilities
of citizens who take part in criminal trials under the participatory trial
system that is hereby adopted to raise democratic legitimacy and confidence
in judicial process and to provide for special cases for trial procedure and
other necessary matters.”74 This was an ambitious textual attempt to connect
the criminal jury trial with democracy.75 Unfortunately, this link is both
incomplete and weak because, while unelected judges do not represent the
will of the people, official jurors are also not elected, and therefore, do not
actually represent the people’s will either.76
In addition, the notion of democracy being realized through criminal
jury trials can be misguided because “mock” justice often occurs in court
due to the participation of lay people. For example, in a famous case
brought against a Superintendent of Education in Seoul, Mr. Heeyeon Cho,
the jury rendered a guilty verdict, therefore risking Mr. Cho’s seat as the
Superintendent.77 The jury in the first trial decided that Mr. Cho had
violated78 an article from the Local Education Public Official Election
Act.79 However, the sentence was suspended by the appellate court,80 which
was then affirmed by the Supreme Court.81 The case against Mr. Cho
demonstrates the misplaced feeling that criminal jury trials are the most
effective way to realize democracy in the judiciary and shows that reflecting
the people’s will by institutionalizing the criminal jury does not necessarily
bring about democratic and just results.82

74

Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 1.
Cha, supra note 16, at 169–76.
76
A majority of legal scholars argues that the advisory nature of juries’ verdicts and sentencing
opinions makes the Act constitutional. Jong-Hyun Kim, A Thought on the Citizen Participation in Criminal
Trials from Constitutional Perspective: Focused on Eligible Cases and Debate on Its Reform, 57 L. REV.
75, 82 (2015) (S. Kor.).
77
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2014GoHap1415, Apr. 27, 2015 (S. Kor.).
78
HoJin Yoon, “Go Seung Deok Heowi Bibang” Cho Hui Yeon, Gyoyukgamjik Yuji [“False
Slanderer of Seungdeok Go” Heeyeon Cho, Remains Superintendent of Education], JOONGANG DAILY,
Dec. 28, 2016, http://news.joins.com/article/21051318.
79
Public Official Election Act, Act. No. 14073, Mar. 3, 2016 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=38405
&lang=ENG.
80
Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2015No1385, Sept. 4, 2015 (S. Kor.).
81
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Do14375, Dec. 27, 2016 (S. Kor.).
82
Jibong Lim, Casting Doubts on Candidates in Public Official Election and Defining Limits on the
Freedom of Expression, 7 YONSEI J. PUB. GOVERNANCE & L. 111, 119 (2016) (S. Kor.).
75
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Reform Comes with Constitutional Challenges

There is no provision in South Korea’s Constitution supporting
criminal jury trials.83 Thus, immediately after judicial reform was completed
through legislation, the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials 84 was
challenged as unconstitutional.85 While the Act provides a means for jury
trial, it alone is insufficient in providing the right to a jury trial; indeed, true
criminal justice reform via participatory justice requires a constitutional
amendment providing for the right to a jury trial. 86 The public’s direct
involvement in the criminal justice system can never be presumed as
reasonable without a clause for direct delegation of authority in the
constitution.
A fundamental issue raised in opposition to jury trials is whether the
Constitution allows lay people to take on the role of provisional judges. 87
While one of the arguments in favor of lay juries is that jurors’ lack of
knowledge of case details before being impaneled may reduce bias, this was
not open for discussion when the Constitution was enacted.

i.

There is No Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial

While criminal jury trials were implemented in Japan in the early
twentieth century,88 the founding fathers of the South Korean Constitution
did not consider including them in the Constitution, despite the continued
influence of Japanese-style judicial proceedings and the United States
military; the Constitution does not provide a right to a jury trial by one’s
own peers.89 Additionally, subsequent amendments to the Constitution
never reflected the idea of participatory justice in the criminal justice
system.90 Only the Act provides a legal basis for a jury trial.91

83

J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82.
See generally Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials.
85
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008HunBa12, Nov. 26, 2009 (S. Kor.).
86
Although the Constitutional Court declares the Act constitutional, it does point out that there is no
constitutional right to a jury trial. Id.
87
J. Kim, supra note 76, at 83.
88
See generally Chang-Kook Kwon, The Study on the Japanese Jury Law (Bai-Shinn Hou, 1923), 26
J. SOC. SCI. 49 (2010) (S. Kor.).
89
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Embedded in the Act, however, are the means by which a court may
act on its discretion to reject a jury trial.92 Articles 9 and 11 provide the
courts with broad discretion to reject a request for a jury trial. 93 Article 9(1)
states that a court may “decide not to proceed to a participatory trial” given
particular conditions. These conditions are fairly broad. If the court finds,
for example, that “a juror . . . has difficulties in attending a trial” or, even
more broadly, “if it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a participatory
trial due to any other cause or event,” it can decide not to grant the
participatory trial.94 Similarly, Article 11(1) provides that the court has
broad discretion to transfer a case tried by a jury to bench trial. 95 According
to Article 11(3), any court decision based on Article 11(1) cannot be
challenged.96
The Act provides the sole legal means by which the accused can
choose a jury trial. Even when the Act provides for a jury trial, the lack of a
constitutional protection of jury trials means that wishes of the accused are
still subject to the court’s discretion.97 Thus, the primary way to fully
establish criminal jury trials as a part of the justice system is to amend the
Constitution to provide for the right to a jury trial. 98 Without this
amendment, any request for a jury trial is subject to the discretion of the
court and the legitimacy of the criminal jury trial in South Korea is at risk of
perpetual criticism.
92

J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82.
Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, arts. 9, 11.
94
Article 9(1) reads: “A court may decide not to proceed to a participatory trial for a period
beginning after an indictment is filed and ending on the day after the closing of preparatory proceedings for
a trial in any of the following cases: (1) If a juror, an alternate juror, or a prospective juror has difficulties in
attending a trial or is unlikely to be able to duly perform his/her duties under this Act because of a violation
or likely violation of the life, body, or property of the juror, alternate juror, prospective juror, or any of
his/her family members; (2) If some of the accomplices do not want a participatory trial and it is considered
difficult to proceed to a participatory trial; (3) If a victim of any offense prescribed in Article 2 of the Act
on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes is committed, or his/her legal
representative does not want a participatory trial; (4) If it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a
participatory trial due to any other cause or event.” Id. art. 9.
95
Article 11(1) reads: “If proceedings of a trial have been suspended for a long time due to the
defendant’s illness or any other cause, if the period of confinement of the defendant expires, if a court is to
protect a victim of a sexual crime, or if it is considered inappropriate to continue a participatory trial in
view of circumstances of a trial due to any other cause or event, the court may decide to remove the case, at
its discretion or at the request of the prosecutor, the defendant, or defense counsel, so that a collegiate panel
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Juries Are Not Currently Authorized to Adjudicate
Criminal Cases

The most fundamental constitutional challenge to the use of criminal
jury trials is disagreement about whether jurors are authorized to handle
criminal cases. Article 27(1) of the Constitution provides: “[a]ll citizens
shall have the right to be tried in conformity with the Act by judges qualified
under the Constitution and the Act.”99 However, the meaning of the term
“judges” in this context is subject to fierce debate.100
This Article, along with a minority of criminal law and criminal
procedure scholars, have suggested that the fact that the Constitution also
provides for the qualification, independence, and powers of judges in
Articles 101–110 confirms that the term “judges” in Article 27 refers only to
professional judges.101 Accordingly, a jury composed of lay persons is never
constitutionally qualified as a “professional judge.”102
Conversely, the majority of criminal law, criminal procedure, and
constitutional law scholars have expressed the view that the people’s interest
trumps the lack of an explicitly enumerated right to a jury trial in the
Constitution.103 According to them, the term “judges” in Article 27 of the
Constitution is not limited to professional judges. 104 Since the Constitution
defines who the “judges” are, the Constitution grants legislative power to the
National Assembly to enact laws interpreting the term “judges.”105 The Act
on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials is the type of legislative action
provided for by the term “the Act” in the Constitution.106 These scholars
also argue that juries engaging in activities such as rendering advisory
verdicts and opinions regarding sentencing are not engaging in the type of
adjudication limited to professional judges. 107 They further argue that, as
long as professional judges are involved in the adjudication process, direct
involvement of the people is not unconstitutional.108
99
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I. Kim, supra note 89, at 315. See also Park, supra note 100, at 435; J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82.
108
I. Kim, supra note 89, at 315.
100

190

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

This interpretation of the Constitution, however, is undermined by
legislation that indicates that, even with a jury trial, judges remain
independent in their final decisions. For example, Article 46(5) of the Act
states that “[n]o verdict and opinions [delivered by a lay jury] under
paragraphs (2) through (4) shall be binding on the court.”109 By providing
for an advisory rather than mandatory effect of a jury verdict and sentencing
opinion, the legislature created a work-around that ensured there would be
no conflict with the Constitution by giving final authority of deciding any
case to professional judges.110 This advisory effect was challenged by the
majority of criminal law, criminal procedure, and constitutional law scholars
because without mandatory power, the criminal jury trial might simply be a
hollow system that the bench could disregard whenever it wishes. 111 But,
even with more than ninety percent of jury decisions matching the judge’s
final judgment in criminal cases, 112 constitutional concern will not go away
without amending the Constitution itself.113 For that reason, the current
system of providing the jury’s verdict and sentencing opinion as only
advisory is unconstitutional. A constitutional amendment that includes lay
juries as a kind of judge is the only way to resolve any constitutional
concern. Amending the Constitution to include lay people as a kind of judge
would give mandatory power to admit their verdict no matter what.
iii.

The Court is Not Capable of Handling the Case
Influx114

Prior to the Act, the expected annual number of criminal jury cases
was less than 300 cases nationwide. 115 However, the number of cases
referred to criminal jury trial was too small to determine. Therefore, it is
difficult to meaningfully consider the huge amount of total criminal cases
per year. In 2008, the first year that criminal jury trials were allowed, only
sixty-four cases nationwide were referred to a jury trial. 116 This number
increased to 345 in 2013, when the Act was amended to extend the range of

109
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eligible cases.117 Since 2013, the trend of more criminal jury trials has
reversed. In 2015, only 203 cases involved criminal jury trials. 118 From
2008 to 2015, less than two percent of eligible cases have been disposed of
by a jury.119 Courts expect the number of jury trials to increase.120
However, this expectation is not realistic, because criminal jury trials are
very different than bench trials and the courts are not prepared to tackle the
maximum number of jury trials.121
Criminal jury trials are very different from the bench trials typically
adjudicated in South Korean courts.122 For example, jury trials require a
court to allocate significantly more time to proceedings and deliberations.123
Conversely, a court can dispose of more than ten bench trials per day. 124
Indeed, sometimes bench trials are allocated less than ten minutes per trial
date.125 If there is witness testimony or a dispute of fact, the time can be
extended.126 However, there are limits to the availability of an extension
because of the other cases that need to be adjudicated the same day. 127 In
contrast, a court devotes an entire day to a single criminal jury trial.128 Even
if the issue is very simple, it takes at least a whole court day to finish one
case.129 In addition, prior to the trial date, a court has a preliminary hearing
to pinpoint important issues.130 Furthermore, there is a limited number of
courts capable of taking jury trial cases.131 Although in theory any threejudge panel could adjudicate a jury trial, only certain panels of judges take
jury trials because their dockets are already full. 132 Current benches are not
Subparagraph 1 of Article 5(1) of the Act was amended to include “cases falling under the
juridiction of a collegiate panel.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 5(1).
118
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capable of handling an influx of jury trial cases if the range of eligible cases
provided for in the Act becomes too wide. 133 Therefore, it is necessary to
have a “reasonable” range of cases or “right number of cases” per year. The
“reasonableness” in this context has long been debated,134 and amendments
only appear to exacerbate this division. This is why the Act did not amend
subparagraph 4 of Article 9(1), which gives the courts discretionary power
to exclude the petitions if “it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a
participatory trial due to any other cause or event.”135
B.

Stage Two: Initiation

The Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials was effectuated in
January 2008. By July 2017, the Act had been amended eight times.136
These amendments added several precautionary measures to avoid granting
defendants’ requests for jury trials when judges hope to exercise their
discretion to adjudicate as a bench trial.137 The most vital provision gave
only advisory power to a jury verdict and has been challenged because its
inconsistent structure undermined the legislative intent of the Act, which
gives the control of power in criminal justice to the people. 138 Below, this
Article discusses the most crucial issues and provisions in the Act that have
been challenged throughout the amendment process.
1.

The Act Has Not Been Amended to Allow for Fully
Mandatory Power by Juries

A jury verdict and opinion on sentencing are not binding on the court
because of the constitutional challenge specified in Stage One. These two
elements of jury decisions are only advisory pursuant to Article 46(5) of the
Act. Multiple attempts by scholars to create a more authoritative role for
juries have not been successful.139
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Id. at 94.
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Both Supreme Court and lower court opinions have held that, while
these decisions by juries are not binding, they cannot easily be disregarded
by judges.140 In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that, although a jury verdict
is not binding, it is “near-mandatory;”141 that is, if the unanimous verdict is
in line with the judge’s decision, it cannot be overturned in the appellate
court.142 Lower courts have similarly taken the view that jury verdicts and
sentencing opinions must not be disregarded by judges. In a case rendered
in Daejun High District Court, the court held that even if a lower court
decision against considering the defendant’s argument for his inadequate
mental capacity had some merit, the Court would maintain the sentencing
opinion accepted by the lower court.143 The Seoul High District Court even
held that if a court decision was made that was not in harmony with a
unanimous not guilty jury verdict, the court’s decision of guilt should be
overturned.144 The Supreme Court Committee on People’s Participation
ultimately noted that the jury verdict holds de facto binding effect, rather
than de jure binding effect.145 The attempt to provide mandatory power for
jury verdicts and jury sentencing opinions by amending the Act failed due to
the constitutional challenges noted in Stage One.
2.

The Act Does Not Provide the Right to a Jury

In South Korea, the accused has no constitutional right to be tried by a
jury and cannot be forced to submit to a trial by their own peers. 146 Article 8
of the Act allows the defendant to apply for a jury trial. 147 Article 9 provides
that trial courts ultimately decide whether a trial will be pursued by a jury or
by the bench.148
The Supreme Court rendered a series of decisions clarifying the
process by which a judge decides whether to send a case to a jury trial. 149 It
required a lower court to confirm that a defendant wished to proceed with a

140
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jury trial; without this, the whole procedure could be void. 150 The appeals
court can cure the flaw if the defendant shows his intent not to take issue
with the flaw and clarifies his intent to have a bench trial.151 This,
unfortunately, is a flawed ruling, because it is a principle of criminal justice
that serious illegality cannot be fixed in a later proceeding. 152 The only way
to explain the holding allowing “rectif[ication] of the wrongs of not properly
proceeding with the defendant’s request for jury trial” is that the jury trial is
neither a duty nor a right awarded to the accused, and that is why the Court
can reinstate already tainted procedure with later validation. 153
3.

The Act was Amended to Have More Criminal Jury Trial
Cases

Before the Act was enacted, the expected number of cases handled by
jury trials was at least 300 cases per year. However, the actual number of
cases handled by juries is far smaller than expected. As a result, the
influence of the jury trial over the entire criminal justice system is
minimized.154 In 2012, Article 5 of the Act was amended to include most of
the cases that would be tried by a panel of three judges to facilitate an
increase in the proportion of criminal trials sent to a jury.155 However, as
noted previously, such an amendment gives rise to serious concern about the
number of cases courts can adjudicate using a jury given their limited
capacity.156
Before the 2012 Amendment, only first-degree murder and
manslaughter cases were eligible for jury trials.157 Focusing upon the most
serious crimes traces back to the common law tradition of giving the right of
jury trials only to defendants accused of felonies.158 The Amendment is
thought to have contributed to the increase in criminal jury trials in 2013.
150
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But, since that year, the number has decreased.159 The Supreme Court of
South Korea is currently considering ways to increase the proportion of
criminal jury trials.160
4.

Victims of Crimes Should be Given the Right to
Participate

While a bench trial is painful for any victim because they must testify
in court, a criminal jury trial is even harder because of the direct
involvement of strangers: the jury.161 Further, the role of the witness/victim
is even more important in a criminal trial. The witness/victim, in testifying
in open court, often re-lives the horror of the crime.162 Victims of sex crimes
tend to suffer the most when they have to testify in court. 163 Thus, when
Article 5 of the Act was amended to increase the number of jury trial cases,
Article 9(1)(3) was amended to provide that “[i]f a victim of any offense
prescribed in Article 2 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the
Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes is committed, or his/her legal
representative does not want a participatory trial,” a court may exercise its
discretion not to proceed to a participatory trial. 164 This new amendment is
meant to address the concern that victims of sex crimes should have a say in
a court’s decision to accept a jury trial application made by a defendant.
This amendment giving sex crime victims the right to be involved
affirms that a jury trial is not a right, and restricts the strategic moves a
defendant might make when choosing a jury trial over a bench trial.
However, the Supreme Court recently limited the exclusion decision based
on Article 9(1)(3) by holding that the court’s exercise of discretion based
solely on the demand made by sex crime victims or lawyers may not be
sufficient to legalize the exclusion decision.165 Instead, the court must
consider factors such as (1) the specific reason for moving to exclude, (2)
the relationship between the accused and the victims, (3) the mental status of
159
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victims and the age of victim, and (4) whether other preventive measures
were provided to prevent secondary victimization.166 These four categories
should be considered in deciding whether to deny the defendant’s
application for jury trials in sex crime cases. In this decision, the Supreme
Court indicated that it expects courts to be cautious when denying requests
by the accused for a jury trial.167 The Supreme Court’s cautious position that
the right to jury trial given to sex crime defendants must be protected shows
a confusing state on the status of the right to jury trial.
C.

Stage Three: Implementation

The initial goal of including the jury trial was to transform the entire
criminal justice system to restore the public’s confidence in the judiciary.168
However, this goal has not been achieved because the proportion of criminal
jury trials has been lower than anticipated.169 The fact that all parties in the
system have different views on the purpose of the jury trial also undermines
the jury trial’s impact on the criminal justice system.
The role an individual plays in the trial affects his or her perspective
on the contribution of jury trials in the criminal justice system. 170 For
example, judges view jury trials as an opportunity to be involved in the case
in a different way.171 However, each judge approaches jury trials
differently.172 This is likely due in part to the lack of detailed guidelines for
jury trial procedure.173 Defendants may view jury trials as a strategic choice.
They may assume that the general public is likely to have harsher views on
punishment than judges, in which case they might avoid requesting jury
trials.174 Lawyers generally view requesting jury trials as a risky move
because juror decisions are unpredictable. Finally, each party is well aware
of the amended provisions of the Act discussed in Stage Two, which allow
more cases to be tried by jury thanks to the expansion of eligible cases
provided in Article 5 of the Act. However, even though some meaningful
changes were made, the outcome has been the same.175 It has been
166
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suggested that changes in law are not reflected in practice.176 It remains to
be seen whether such legislative overhaul would bring any meaningful
outcome changes, such as more judges granting the defendants’ wishes to
have jury trials.
D.

Stage Four: Routinization

While courts have been wrong in predicting the right number of
criminal jury cases per year, they have always been publically willing to
provide any means necessary to accommodate any number of cases.177
However, their explicit attempt to hear more cases is not evidenced by the
actual number of jury trials granted; the overall percentage of jury trial
requests granted is about forty percent, and has been for five years.178
Furthermore, the fact that courts are working to guarantee the legitimacy of
jury verdicts and sentencing opinions does not seem to help the jury trial
become a routine procedure in the criminal justice system. 179 But there are
many signs that the new system of criminal justice—the criminal jury trial—
has gained support from the bench and the public as a routine system, at
least for the foreseeable future.180
1.

Most Jury Verdicts Correlate with Final Judicial
Decisions

Although the jury verdict is only advisory, more than ninety percent
of jury verdicts since 2008 have been consistent with the holding of the
judge.181 This percentage has remained consistent over time, despite
amendments to the Act.182 Judges appear reluctant to disagree with juries
because they respect the decision made by the defendants’ peers.183 Since
any decision made by the jury cannot be easier to make than those made by
the bench, this high level of correspondence is quite meaningful. 184 It means
that judges agree with juries on findings of fact. This de facto mandatory
power given to jury decisions has been cited as a sign of success for the
176
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criminal jury trial;185 it shows that courts have tried to control the issues
settled by juries, ultimately leading juries to find facts and recommend
sentences that courts would render by themselves.186
2.

Educating the Public

Part of the original intent of the jury trial was to expose the general
public to the criminal justice system.187 People who have served on juries
generally view the experience as positive. 188 However, this represents only a
very small fraction of the population. Some scholars even praise this smallscale phenomenon as one which can be understood as an enormous
success.189 However, it cannot be denied that the impact on the people is
fairly limited, as few people have yet to serve on juries.190 The difficulty in
routinizing the process of the criminal jury trial has been a driving force
behind amendments to expand eligible jury cases under the Act.
3.

Number of Criminal Jury Trials are Still Negligible

Fewer than two percent of all criminal trials are jury trials. 191 Thus,
the original goal of transforming the criminal justice system with the
criminal jury trial has not been realized. Furthermore, future attempts to
increase the number of criminal jury trials do not look promising, even after
amending the Act to include more cases, as the current number of jury trials
has not shown any meaningful increase.192 A constitutional amendment is
necessary to make the jury the mandatory fact-finder for every felony
case.193
E.

Stage Five: Evaluation

The 2008 Act was a revolutionary attempt towards a participatory
criminal justice system. The willingness to immediately enforce the Act
without further deliberation or a waiting period reflects the experimental
185
186
187
188
189
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period of five years, after which the process was re-evaluated by a newly
formed committee under the Supreme Court.194 Despite many scholars’
grim predictions, public perception of the Act was surprisingly positive,
even if its real impact on the overall criminal justice system has been
minimal.195
The future success of the criminal jury trial hinges on whether both
the general public and legal professionals are confident enough in the
benefits of jury trials to make them compulsory. 196 Ultimately, the simple
measure of amending the Act will be insufficient to silence the concerns
about the constitutionality of jury trials.197 The only way to protect jury
trials from these challenges is through a constitutional amendment
enumerating the right to a jury trial for at least all cases eligible for a threejudge panel, as provided in the Act. In addition, to ease the minds of legal
professionals, enough infrastructure must be in place to accommodate the
influx of cases following a constitutional amendment mandating all felony
cases be subject to a criminal jury trial. Currently, the process of subjecting
all cases eligible for a three-judge panel to criminal jury trials is undergoing
a second test period.198
This first revolutionary act of letting the public be directly involved in
the criminal justice system has been praised as a success by both the public
and legal scholars.199 However, the ambition of realizing democracy in the
criminal justice system is not yet near being fulfilled.
The basic premise that the inclusion of criminal jury trials is the best
way to realize democracy in the criminal justice system may be based on a
false assumption that the jury trial is the symbol of democracy in criminal
justice system. Though the premise may be flawed and the execution
problematic, the people’s belief that criminal jury trials must be a standard
for serious crimes has not changed after eight or nine years. However,
educating the public broadly has been less consistent. Initially, courts were
very enthusiastic about publicizing criminal jury trials by putting
advertisements on television and raising public understanding about this type
194
195
196
197
198
199
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of trial.200
However, after nearly ten years, visible campaigns or
advertisements to publicize criminal jury trials are no longer a part of
television.201
There is, unfortunately, not enough legal training in general about the
difference between facts and law. Sufficient understanding with respect to
the legal impact of some factual issues is necessary to ensure that final
decisions are not the result of errors. Better training and education of legal
minds may be needed “even if this may lead to a reduction in the ‘fresh lay
perspective.’”202 South Korea never had a meaningful opportunity to debate
the rationale for instituting criminal jury trials, and therefore lay people need
to be provided with some legal understanding to address a case in front of
them.203 By doing this work, public confidence in criminal jury trials would
become even stronger, and legal professionals’ uneasiness about the
mandatory criminal jury trial would be allayed to a degree. For that purpose,
jury instructions must be more guided and transparent, and “legalese” must
be translated into laymen’s terms.204
III.

CONCLUSION

Moving forward, a fundamental question is whether democracy
should be a goal in the criminal justice system in any country. 205 The
ultimate goal of a criminal justice system in South Korea should be to realize
justice, and there are times when democracy results in the sacrifice of
accuracy. Providing an opportunity for lay people might help to restore the
peoples’ trust in the judiciary; however, it does not necessarily guarantee fair
decisions.
With a new administration taking office after the impeachment of
former President Park, the President-elect Moon Jae-in announced that 2017
and 2018 would be a time for contemplation and devising a new
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Constitution.206 Unfortunately, including the right to jury trial in the
Constitution is not predicted to be a priority for the incoming government.207
The President and his administration side with the majority of scholars who
consider it unnecessary to create a constitutional right to a jury trial because
its current construction is sufficient for that purpose.208 Despite this
prediction, people should realize that justice is not being served ideally with
participation from the general public. Participatory justice should not be a
patch to restore the public confidence in the judiciary. Instead, a full-scale
attempt to have criminal jury trials for entire felony cases would do
tremendous work to overhaul the entire criminal justice system. In order to
make this happen, the criminal justice system in South Korea needs more
preparation to shore up the legal and practical bases of this procedural
change.
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